The U.S. role in Israel's war against Hezbollah
Washington is mostly along for the ride - wherever it's headed
Let’s talk about the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, why Hezbollah’s response has seemed so much tamer than anticipated, and how U.S. decisions have left Washington with little control over a conflict which could eventually heavily involve U.S. forces. Most of this post is paywalled. Upgrade to a paid subscription in order to read it and to support America Explained.
I’ve spent many hours in recent days trying to figure out exactly what is going on in Lebanon. Israel has, of course, dramatically escalated its attacks on Hezbollah, first with attacks by exploding communications devices and then by a truly enormous aerial bombardment. But what has been somewhat puzzling to me is that Hezbollah so far seems to have been limited in its response. It has continued to lob mostly inaccurate short-range projectiles into northern Israel and carried out relatively few attempted strikes with its more long-range, precise weaponry.
So far, the conflict has looked from the Israeli perspective almost too good to be true. Previous estimates of the consequences of a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah have estimated that the result could be thousands of dead Israeli civilians and widespread destruction in urban areas. Hezbollah’s possession of 150,000 missiles is often cited, although it’s clear that the capacity to launch these simultaneously is obviously much more limited. Why haven’t these scenarios come true? Given Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah’s communications and command and control network, it’s legitimate to ask whether Hezbollah is not responding decisively because it doesn’t want to - or because it can’t.
From talking to experts, it seems that the consensus is that Hezbollah’s more limited response so far is largely due to self-restraint. I don’t think anyone really knows why it is exercising this restraint, but three factors are commonly cited. The first is that Iran will not (yet) give Hezbollah permission to enter an all-out war. The second is that Hezbollah/Iran probably assesses that the group can survive the current Israeli air assault with its key assets intact, and that it is not yet threatened to the extent that escalating to an all-out conflict is worthwhile. This ought to make us doubt claims by some analysts that Hezbollah has already lost a large segment of its long-range missile capabilities. The third is that Hezbollah wants to keep back some capabilities as deterrence against an Israeli ground operation into southern Lebanon, which would pose a more serious threat to the group.
That means we’re now in state of uneasy equilibrium. Israel is pounding Hezbollah with air attacks and trying to intimidate it into withdrawing its forces north of the Litani river, which would then allow the return of Israel’s northern residents to their homes. Hezbollah is refusing to withdraw and is committed to weathering Israel’s attacks, presenting Israel with a choice: back down or escalate to a ground offensive.
Where is the United States in all of this?
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