10 thoughts on the Middle East ceasefire
What is going on?
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I’m going to preface this by saying that you probably don’t come here for your Middle East politics takes - and that if you do, you ought to consider looking elsewhere, like
’s Love of the Land newsletter. Still, if we’re going to talk about American foreign policy, we need a mental model of the other parts of the world that the U.S. is interacting with, and here I’ll be relying on my mental model of the Middle East. YMMV.When I first read the 20 points of the peace plan, I thought three things: (a) this is ridiculous; (b) multiple of the actors involved in this (Hamas, Israel, or the U.S.) must be expecting this to not really fly; (c) if it does fly for a while, eventually someone is going to blow it up, purposefully or otherwise.
I still think points (a) through (c) are basically accurate.
Of course, some parts of the plan are less ridiculous than others. A hostages for ceasefire/prisoners swap is in a sense the “easiest” part of any deal to end this conflict, and the part that is most likely to actually happen. Some clauses, like the U.S. overseeing a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians, are fairly anodyne.
But handing the governance of Gaza over to a “technocratic, apolitical” committee of Palestinians under the ultimate direction of a “Board of Peace” headed by Donald Trump and Tony Blair strikes me as someone’s idea of a bad sitcom. Meanwhile, the deployment of an international stabilization force which is going to disarm Hamas and demilitarize the Gaza Strip strikes me as someone’s idea of a really bad guerrilla war to get yourself into. I wouldn’t exactly bet my house on these things not happening, but I would come close.
Part of the problem seems to me to be this: no-one has really done any serious work on how the post-war governance of Gaza is going to work. The problem of doing so seems basically intractable. For decades, the Arab states and the West have run as far as possible from actually putting their skin into this game. Nobody wants to be the head of Gaza because being the head of Gaza would be a great way to become responsible for a disaster. With the guile of novice, Trump has just blundered in and taken on the mantle anyway - but I really don’t think he knows what doing so means.
How is he going to deal with the armed factions? Getting enough aid to people? Rebuilding? Putting together a political process that looks legitimate and acceptable to the outside world and to Palestinians themselves? (Has Trump heard of the 2006 Palestinian elections and how that turned out?) And how is he going to do all of this and more alongside an Israeli government which considers what happens in Gaza an existential interest and which has by far the greatest military ability to actually shape facts on the ground in the enclave?
The thing I find most opaque about the current situation is what Netanyahu is thinking. I don’t understand why this has happened now. Sure, Trump has pressured Netanyahu - but so in the past did Biden and, for that matter, Trump himself. Clearly the aftermath of the failed strike in Qatar touched a nerve in a White House with plenty of political and personal financial links to the Gulf monarchies, but did that really produce enough tangible pressure on Netanyahu to move him? I find the nature of this “pressure” undefined and confusing.
Of course, Netanyahu might have just decided that he wants to end the war now anyway. Israel has certainly transformed its regional security environment beyond the previous imaginings of its political elite, and it had to call it quits sometime. I’m no expert on the dynamics of Israeli right-wing opinion, but the West Bank-ification of Gaza seems like a really dumb and self-destructive idea, so I’m not too surprised that that’s not the post-war plan. But I find it extremely difficult to imagine that these 20 points are the real plan either.
For now, if the killing will stop - particularly if it will stay stopped - we ought to celebrate. In truth, the end to this round of conflict was always likely to look something like this - partial, confused, and extremely tenuous. Let us pray that it may one day become complete, clear, and unending.
I'll throw a few thoughts together in the hope that they form a coherent whole.
First off, the only component that is time limited is the hostage release (at the time of writing, this is complete -at least for the living). You could argue that from Israel's perspective, that is by far the most critical aspect of the entire deal, enabling the country to pause fighting and start the painful process of healing.
Secondly, the Gulf countries will fund Gaza's reconstitution and therefore have some incentive to ensure that at least a certain kind of peace is maintained. It goes without saying that the Gulf is not a homogenous entity and the objectives of the UAE and Qatar are quite contradictory (the latter plays both sides). The Europeans will make a big fuss but have (IMO) far more important issues to deal with including a potential conflict with Russia and trying to combat Chinese imports (and the ensuing destruction of their industrial base). Turkey will likely play a spoiler role (supporting Hamas) but there are limits.
Thirdly, the approach "leans in" to the Good Friday Agreement (hence Tony Blair's involvement) but the differences between Hamas and the IRA are far more stark than their similarities. Just because both Ismail Haniyeh & Gerry Adams have beards, you can't conclude that IRA=Hamas (an obvious statement but worth stating anyway).
Fourthly, there are far bigger geopolitical fish to fry than this ceasefire and Netanyahu knows this perfectly well. In a timescale of perhaps less than 10 years the ME will be reshaped by economic reality as oil demand likely declines (China's has probably peaked). True, there will be some spikes but the trajectory seems quite clear cut. This deal is is but one step one this pathway which could include some kind of formalised relationship between Israel & Saudi Arabia.
Trump has an uncanny ability to pivot-if it fails, he will not be on the hook for its failure-certainly domestically. The US is not really committing any tangible investment.