Round-up: Europe's war after the war. Trump turns the screws on Japan. And Trump has Denmark up all night.

Analysis of the week's events

Thanks for reading America Explained! Paid subscriptions are what keeps this newsletter a going concern, so please upgrade if you’re able to spare a few dollars or euros or whatever (I’m not picky!) a month to support independent commentary and to access all of our posts. As always, students and educators can get a full subscription for free - just drop me a line.

The war after the war

Let’s forget about Russia’s 28-point peace plan for a minute and zoom out.

However this phase of the war in Ukraine ends, it is unlikely to mean the end of war in Europe for long. Any deal that leaves Ukraine sovereign and free is likely to be unacceptable to Moscow, and there’s a good chance that Putin might also opt for an eventual war against NATO.

In fact, from Putin’s perspective, a war against NATO might actually be the best way to ensure a free hand against Ukraine. NATO is shot through with divisions - U.S. vs. Europe, Western European vs. Eastern Europe - that make it vulnerable to a collapse of political will. Its military forces, and the complex logistical and administrative system needed to coordinate and support them, are not battle tested. If Ukraine is a porcupine, Europe is more like a giant inflatable bouncy castle - it looks substantial from a distance, but one swift poke and the air is liable to come out of it.

We don’t know exactly what Russia will do five or ten years from now. As always, the future consists of a spectrum of possibilities, none of which we can be certain will come to pass or that we can prevent. But good statesmanship consists of doing whatever you can to nudge the future in a desirable direction.

Unfortunately, this is precisely the opposite of what Trump is doing. Instead, he’s getting it wrong in at least four different ways.

Firstly and most obviously, he’s displaying a clear pro-Russia bias. Steve Witkoff handing over Vladimir Putin’s wishlist straight to Ukraine is only the latest and least subtle example of this. More broadly, Trump has signalled from the very beginning of his term that he basically accepts Russia’s narrative of the conflict, is willing to demand steep concessions from Ukraine, and prioritizes good relations with Russia.

These things aren’t just worrying because they indicate that Trump might impose a bad deal on Ukraine. They’re also a terrible negotiating strategy because they telegraph desperation and an unwillingness to use Washington’s leverage to the maximum extent to weaken Russia over the long term. No wonder Putin keeps holding out for the best deal, one that will place him in a good position to fight the war after this war.

Secondly, Trump and his officials are making clear their disdain for Europe. If we want to deter Russia from starting the next war, then it’s vital that it believe that any attempt to divide America from Europe will fail. If Putin thinks that Washington is going to run for the hills the minute he orders his forces through the Suwalki Gap, that makes him much more likely to take a gamble. Displaying solidarity with Europe is one of the best things Washington can do to try to nudge the future towards peace.

But Trump doesn’t show solidarity - instead he takes almost every opportunity to humiliate Europe, often in purely symbolic and pointless ways. Dreaming up “peace” proposals without even asking for European input and then having White House officials leak to the press that they don’t really care what the Europeans think anyway is a sure means of telling Russia that Washington doesn’t care about the future of Europe. And that’s very dangerous.

Thirdly, Trump runs his policy process in such a chaotic way that it makes America look inconstant and untrustworthy.

I’m sure there’s still someone out there in the world who is convinced that Trump’s erratic negotiating style is just some sort of genius ploy to extract the best deal. But to most of us, it looks like incompetence and a fundamental lack of seriousness. It’s demoralizing to Europe and Ukraine, because it’s hard to plan your future around an America that can elect this buffoon. And it also emboldens Russia, because it suggests that the U.S. is not going to establish a clear deterrent line and then stick to it. That’s practically an invitation to war.

Fourthly and finally, given all of this circus and chaos, the United States under Trump is not actually doing anything positive and constructive to improve NATO’s military and political position. We’re busy talking about all of the ways he is undermining Europe and Ukraine when even if he was laser-focused on helping the continent prepare for a future Russian invasion, it still might not be ready on time.

Trump exerts a constant sapping influence on America’s allies, draining their political will and attention in futile controversies and setbacks rather than helping them build their resilience. He thinks that by doing so he’s making America stronger - no more freeloading foreigners will be taking Uncle Sam for a ride! But all he’s really doing is making it much more likely that in the long run, we will all pay a terrible cost for his follies.

Trump turns the screws on Japan

A similar dynamic is also playing out on the other side of the world.

A few days ago, Japan’s new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested that if China attacks Taiwan, Japan will respond militarily. China’s leadership was furious, and Xi Jinping let Trump know in a phone call shortly afterwards. Later that same day, Trump called Sanae and told her to back off.¹

So, here again we have Trump putting pressure on an ally in order to appease a great power rival - one with territorial ambitions of its own, ambitions that can best be thwarted by the U.S. maintaining a tight relationship with local allies.

Japan to be stating its willingness to fight China ought to be precisely the sort of thing that Trump wants to happen. After all, he’s the president who wants America’s allies around the world to take on more security responsibilities of their own and reduce Washington’s defense burden. Instead, he chose to slap his ally down and send the signal that not only does he not want to defend Taiwan, but he doesn’t want anyone else to do it either.

Why might be do this? I have a few ideas.