The return of the no-fly zone in Venezuela

A much-used tool is back - but does it ever work?

Thanks for reading America Explained! Subscribe for free to receive our free posts, and pay a little per month to get the rest.

On Saturday, Donald Trump announced that Venezuelan airspace should be considered “closed”. The move is the latest step in his campaign of escalation against the country, which seems intended to force Nicholas Maduro to leave office and hand over power to the opposition.

But at the same time, Trump’s announcement also heralded the return of a much-used foreign policy tool - the no-fly zone. In the past, the U.S. has shut down air traffic over particular areas both as a form of protection of the civilians within them (for instance in Iraq and Bosnia in the 1990s) and as a form of coercive diplomacy (for instance in Libya in 2011).

Despite the fact that they have a very patchy record of achieving results and raise a host of military and legal challenges, no-fly zones are a persistent tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox.

In order to understand why, I interviewed Gustav Meibauer, an academic who wrote an excellent recent book on no-fly zones and U.S. foreign policy. We talked about what Trump might be up to, how it fits into the broader history of no-fly zones, and whether he can back down now that he’s gone this far.

Andy: On Saturday Trump said that the airspace over Venezuela should be considered closed, although we should note that the U.S. hasn’t taken any actual action to enforce this decree yet. There’s speculation that this might be a precursor to U.S. military strikes within Venezuelan territory, but it also serves the dual purpose of increasing the psychological pressure on Maduro and his regime. Trump wants Maduro to leave the country, and he’s trying to scare him into doing so. Has this sort of coercive diplomacy via no-fly zone ever gotten results before?

Gustav: Not really, no – at least if we look more narrowly at previous cases of no-fly zone use, rather than the threat of airpower more broadly (even the latter has a distinctly patchy track record.)

Conceivably, in Iraq, the no-fly zones had a deterrent function in that they constrained Saddam Hussein’s freedom of operation against the Kurds in the North, and to a lesser degree against the Shias in the South. Bosnia might come closest in terms of coercive diplomacy – some people in the Bush and Clinton administrations thought that the threat of enforcement a no-fly zone would increase pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to come to the table more seriously. But it didn’t, and they didn’t.

In Libya, I think the view was very quickly that Ghaddafi would not be coerced into backing down from crushing the rebellion. While the no-fly zone did contribute to his eventual demise, this was mostly due to its rapid actual enforcement as the declaration of the zone itself proved ineffectual at actually changing the situation on the ground.

There are, of course, considerable differences between these cases and the Venezuela case. It is notable that in the Venezuela case, the humanitarian rationales present in previous cases (at the very least as a pretense, but more likely as a genuine motivator for at least some key US decision-makers) are almost completely absent. Previous no-fly zones also had more limited aims, and often failed even at those, e.g. conflict management or protection of civilians. While much in this case depends on Maduro’s calculus, if we think the aim of this quasi-no-fly-zone is indeed regime change, it is very unlikely to work.

Andy: It’s interesting that the purpose of Trump’s announcement is indeed somewhat ambiguous. He clearly wants Caracas to think that this is the precursor to a military attack in order to pressure Maduro to leave. But we don’t actually know whether that attack is going to come, and if it does how broad it will be. No-fly zones, like sanctions, seem often to be a blunt instrument that the U.S. uses to just “do something” to signal intent and seriousness in the hope that an adversary backs down. Why do U.S. administrations keep using this tool when it so infrequently works?

Gustav: Like I argue in my book (shameless plug!), the no-fly zone is the perfect solution to seemingly intractable political disagreement. Distilling effective strategy and policy takes time, energy and focus. Faced with complex issues, the exact consequences of which are frequently unclear or ignored, decision makers are incentivized to choose what look like easy, low-cost solutions that they can reach agreement on.

We need to understand the no-fly zone as the solution to a political problem, then, not primarily a military-strategic one. The no-fly zone seems satisfactory to lots of different policymakers who would otherwise disagree: it employs military force, but not too much; it is costly, but not that much (compared to its more forceful alternatives, at least); it signals intent, but also sounds restrained, reasonable and competent.

This is also why decision-makers don’t seem to “learn” from past shortcomings of the tool – the no-fly zone is simply too attractive in situations where being seen to do something seems necessary. Indeed, the no-fly zone may be so successful at this that it has morphed from an actual military instrument into something that is employed primarily in the domestic political arena. It persists to the extent that decision-makers just apply it automatically to vexing foreign policy problems (like we saw in the debate over a no-fly zone in Syria in 2015/16 and over western Ukraine more recently). It is very interesting that this effect seems to extend even to a self-declared “outsider” Donald Trump.

Andy: So it’s an attractive tool in terms of American politics. But what about the legalities, both domestically and internationally? Have previous no-fly zones always been authorized by institutions like the UN Security Council, and what are the implications of that not having occurred here?

Gustav: This ‘announcement’, whatever it actually means in terms of future US policy, has little to no legal basis. Previous no-fly zones were at least argued to be grounded in UNSC resolutions. The Iraqi ones were based on a (slightly peculiar) interpretation of a sequence of UNSC resolutions that defined the sanctions regime against Saddam Hussein after the Persian Gulf War, even though those resolutions don’t mention the term or explicitly authorize no-fly zones. The Bosnian no-fly zones were explicitly authorized via UNSC resolutions.

The Libyan no-fly zone was also explicitly authorized, although there are big question marks about whether that authorization covered the aggressive air campaign that was ultimately carried out.

On Venezuela, there isn’t even a whiff of UNSC authorization, which seems indicative of the current administration’s willingness to simply ignore international law – the half-heartedly offered self-defense justification is nonsensical; even if it were not, a no-fly zone would do little to address the purported problem.

Andy: Right - and I think it’s fair to say that in terms of domestic law, there’s also only a pretextual justification for this. Trump argues that strikes would be legal because the Venezuelan military has been designated as a “narco-terrorist” entity, but that’s highly questionable and would anyway not cover the use of force to impose a no-fly zone. Particularly if it involved targeting civilian air transport - which Trump seemed to suggest it would.

One theme of Trump’s foreign policy is his attraction to low-cost acts that he can present as “solutions” to intractable problems. I’m thinking especially about how he loves to hold press conferences and sign agreements even if they lead to little fundamental change in the underlying situation. As you explain, no-fly zones can be seen in this tradition - they allow the appearance of action at a relatively low cost. But it seems that in this case at least, it also creates an expectation of escalation, and Trump could suffer reputational costs from backing down now. Is this a dynamic we’ve seen in previous cases of (proposed or actual) no-fly zones, and how do you think it impacts Trump now?

Gustav: This cuts to the heart of Trump’s idiosyncratic foreign policy style. Based on previous cases, Trump backing down does not seem to carry heavy reputational costs for him domestically. And these seem to be the primary type of costs Trump cares about.

This has to do with political polarization, which makes it much more likely that Republicans will stick with him whatever he does. It’s also to do with how he performs foreign policy, including threats of military force, predominantly for show (as also suggested by announcing it on Truth Social). The show seems to be the point, rather than any particular concrete outcome.

Should he back down, this is likely to have reputational costs internationally, however. Adversaries and partners alike learn that Trump is easily distracted, does not live up to his word, and whatever threats he makes may or may not be carried through. No matter the so-called “madman strategy” of creating uncertainty by appearing unpredictable, such unpredictability is in fact detrimental to any attempt to effectively coerce adversaries or persuade partners.

Previous administrations have indeed also dithered over no-fly zones – especially as the tool proved unable to compel Saddam Hussein in Iraq, or force the Bosnian Serbs to the table in Bosnia. In Bosnia, the Bush administration did indeed suffer reputational costs for its unwillingness to actually enforce a no-fly zone in Bosnia. Bill Clinton called Bush “the inaction man” in the 1992 campaign, although once he became president he also didn’t escalate any further. In both Iraq and Bosnia, the situation only changed years later, when there was new political momentum to do something more.

Andy: Right - although in this case I think that one domestic group Trump could expect to suffer some severe costs with if he backs down are Cuban/Venezuelan-Americans, among whom he has raised expectations that this is leading to the overthrow of Maduro. But it also seems that the public at large is so far just treating this as just Trump being Trump, do not expect it to escalate to an actual war, and say they would not be happy if it did. Looking at the international and domestic dynamics, what’s your best guess for what happens next?

I think there’s still a strong possibility that, just as with previous cases, Trump does back down as his attention jumps to the next shiny thing. The Cuban/Venezuelan voters may punish him for this, yes, but it strikes me as more likely that they’ll break, or have already broken, with Trump over immigration policy and ICE raids. This case is not going to be decisive.

That said, there seem to be actors in and around the Trump administration keen to have this escalate further; and some things have actually been locked in (e.g. military capabilities moved to the Caribbean). In any case, I don’t think Trump has the stamina or focus to actually pursue regime change in Venezuela. He might not have the institutional backing either. My guess, and that’s all this is, is limited airstrikes and a quick “mission accomplished” thereafter at worst. At best, Trump will find something else to announce on Truth Social and this fizzles out similar to Greenland and Panama (just that here, people actually died).

Thanks for reading America Explained! Paid subscriptions are what keeps this newsletter a going concern, so please upgrade if you’re able to spare a few dollars or euros or whatever (I’m not picky!) a month to support independent commentary and to access all of our posts. And as always, students and educators can get a full subscription for free - just drop me a line.